What? Now. Predictive Coding and Enculturation

Regina Fabry has proposed an intriguing marriage of enculturated cognition and predictive processing. I raise some questions for whether this marriage will work and warn against expecting too much from the predictive processing framework. Furthermore I argue that the predictive processes at a sub-personal level cannot be driving the innovations at a social level that lead to enculturated cognitive systems, like those explored in my target paper

Pragmatism and the pragmatic turn in cognitive science

This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and provides some of the conceptual background to the “pragmatic turn” currently underway in cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on cognition from a naturalistic perspective, and many of their views are compatible with contemporary pragmatist approaches such as enactivist, extended, and embodied-Bayesian approaches to cognition. Three principles of a pragmatic approach to cognition frame the discussion: First, thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability throughout the life cycle. Finally, inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritating doubts that arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference

Peirce and Wittgenstein on Doubt: A Comparison

There are many areas of Peirce and Wittgenstein"s thought\ud which have great affinity for one another such as: the\ud impossibility of a private language, the distinction between\ud believing and knowing, and the role of doubt and certainty\ud in our epistemic practices. I shall focus on the affinity\ud between Peirce and Wittgenstein"s thought on the role of\ud doubt in our epistemic practices. I will argue that Peirce\ud and Wittgenstein give us a "broadly" pragmatic account of\ud the role of doubt and by this I mean, they are interested in\ud the difference doubt makes to our epistemic practices (I do\ud not mean by this that Wittgenstein is part of a philosophical\ud movement called pragmatism). Specifically, Peirce and\ud Wittgenstein argue against the skeptical, or Cartesian,\ud form of doubt that has dominated epistemological discussion.\ud They deny that universal doubt is a genuine doubt;\ud such a "doubt" is idle, because it does not have any practical\ud consequences for us. Genuine doubt must have a\ud ground and of course there is no rule that can determine\ud whether a ground for doubt is genuine in all circumstances.\ud Doubts occur in a context, with all our prejudices and\ud beliefs in place

Mathematical Cognition: A Case of Enculturation

Most thinking about cognition proceeds on the assumption that we are born with our primary cognitive faculties intact and they simply need to mature, or be fine-tuned by learning mechanisms. Alternatively, a growing number of thinkers are aligning themselves to the view that a process of enculturation transforms our basic biological faculties. What evidence is there for this process of enculturation? A long period of development, learning-driven plasticity, and a cultural environment suffused with practices, symbols, and complex social interactions all speak in its favour. In this paper I will sketch in outline the commitments of the enculturated approach and then look at the case of mathematical cognition as a central example of enculturation. I will then defend the account against several objections

What? Now: predictive coding and enculturation ; a reply to Regina E. Fabry

Regina Fabry has proposed an intriguing marriage of enculturated cognition and predictive processing. I raise some questions for whether this marriage will work and warn against expecting too much from the predictive processing framework. Furthermore I argue that the predictive processes at a sub-personal level cannot be driving the innovations at a social level that lead to enculturated cognitive systems, like those explored in my target paper

A mechanism of internal decadal atlantic ocean variability in a high-resolution coupled climate model

The North Atlantic Ocean subpolar gyre (NA SPG) is an important region for initialising decadal climate forecasts. Climate model simulations and palaeo climate reconstructions have indicated that this region could also exhibit large, internally generated variability on decadal timescales. Understanding these modes of variability, their consistency across models, and the conditions in which they exist, is clearly important for improving the skill of decadal predictions — particularly when these predictions are made with the same underlying climate models. Here we describe and analyse a mode of internal variability in the NA SPG in a state-of-the-art, high resolution, coupled climate model. This mode has a period of 17 years and explains 15–30% of the annual variance in related ocean indices. It arises due to the advection of heat content anomalies around the NA SPG. Anomalous circulation drives the variability in the southern half of the NA SPG, whilst mean circulation and anomalous temperatures are important in the northern half. A negative feedback between Labrador Sea temperatures/densities and those in the North Atlantic Current is identified, which allows for the phase reversal. The atmosphere is found to act as a positive feedback on to this mode via the North Atlantic Oscillation which itself exhibits a spectral peak at 17 years. Decadal ocean density changes associated with this mode are driven by variations in temperature, rather than salinity — a point which models often disagree on and which we suggest may affect the veracity of the underlying assumptions of anomaly-assimilating decadal prediction methodologies

Exploring the impact of CMIP5 model biases on the simulation of North Atlantic decadal variability

Instrumental observations, palaeo-proxies, and climate models suggest significant decadal variability within the North Atlantic subpolar gyre (NASPG). However, a poorly sampled observational record and a diversity of model behaviours mean that the precise nature and mechanisms of this variability are unclear. Here, we analyse an exceptionally large multi-model ensemble of 42 present-generation climate models to test whether NASPG mean state biases systematically affect the representation of decadal variability. Temperature and salinity biases in the Labrador Sea co-vary and influence whether density variability is controlled by temperature or salinity variations. Ocean horizontal resolution is a good predictor of the biases and the location of the dominant dynamical feedbacks within the NASPG. However, we find no link to the spectral characteristics of the variability. Our results suggest that the mean state and mechanisms of variability within the NASPG are not independent. This represents an important caveat for decadal predictions using anomaly-assimilation methods

The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects

In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally-laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct